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Abstract: Ensuring a correct behaviour of Systems of Systems (SoS) has a significant social
impact. Their complexity and inherent dynamicity pose a serious challenge to traditional design
methodologies. We propose a methodology and a tool-chain supporting continuous validation
of SoS behaviour against formal requirements, based on a scalable formal verification technique
known as Statistical Model Checking (SMC). We integrate SMC with existing industrial practice,
by addressing both methodological and technological issues. Our contribution is summarized as
follows: (1) a methodology for continuous and scalable validation of SoS formal requirements; (2) a
natural-language based formal specification language able to express complex SoS requirements;
(3) adoption of widely used industry standards for simulation and heterogeneous systems integra-
tion (FMI and UPDM); (4) development of a robust SMC tool-chain integrated with system design
tools used in practice. We illustrate the application of our SMC tool-chain and the obtained results
on an industrial case study from the DANSE project.
Key-words: systems of systems, FMI, statistical model checking
Résumé : S’assurer qu’un Système de Systèmes (SdS) se comporte correctement est essentiel
pour notre société. La complexité et le côté dynamique inhérent à ce type de systèmes constitue
un défi pour les méthodes de conception traditionnelles. Nous proposons une méthodologie et
une chaîne d’outils permettant de valider la conformité du comportement d’un SdS vis-à-vis d’un
ensemble de propriétés formelles. Cette méthodologie est fondée sur la vérification statistique de
modèles (SMC). Nous intégrons SMC dans les pratiques industrielles existantes, en résolvant des
problèmes méthodologiques et technologiques. Notre contribution comporte: (1) une méthodolo-
gie passant à l’échelle pour valider la conformité d’un SdS avec des propriétés formelles ; (2) un
langage proche du langage naturel pour exprimer les propriétés formelles complexes attendues
du SdS ; (3) l’adoption de standards pour la simulation et l’intégration de modèles hétérogènes
largement utilisés dans l’industrie (FMI et UPDM); (4) le développement d’une chaîne d’outils
robuste intégrant les outils de conception de systèmes utilisés par les praticiens. Nous illus-
trons l’utilisation de notre chaîne d’outils et les résultat obtenus avec un cas d’étude industriel
provenant du projet DANSE.
Mots-clés : systèmes de systèmes, FMI, vérification statistique de modèles
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1 Introduction
A System of Systems (SoS) is a large-scale, geographically distributed set of independently man-
aged, heterogeneous Constituent Systems (CS) collaborating as a whole to accomplish functions
that could not be achieved otherwise by any of them, if considered alone [18]. Constituent
Systems are loosely coupled and pursue their own objectives, while collaborating for achieving
SoS-level objectives. An SoS performs a continuous adaptation to its environment through (1) an
evolution of the functions provided by its Constituent Systems and (2) an evolution of its archi-
tecture. A typical example of an SoS is the Air Traffic Management System of an airport, which
coordinates incoming and outgoing aircraft as well as ground-based vehicles and controllers. Mis-
behaviours of the functions provided by an SoS can be dangerous and costly. Therefore, it is
important to identify a set of analyses and tools to verify that the SoS implementation meets
functional and non functional requirements and correctly adapts to changes of the environment
during any phase of the design and operation life-cycle. These analyses should support continu-
ous and rapid assessment of SoS behaviour to support run-time decisions.
Recent work promotes simulation techniques as the principal way to perform SoS analysis.
In [28] the authors use discrete event specification (DEVS) concepts and tools to support virtual
build and test of systems of systems. Their MS4-Me environment enables modelling and sim-
ulation (M&S) of SoS by allowing the user to specify constituent systems’ behaviour in terms
of a so-called Constrained Natural Language. Recent work in [21] provides an overview of the
underlying theory, methods, and solutions in M&S of systems of systems, to better understand
how modelling and simulation can support the Systems of Systems engineering process. However,
simulation is an incomplete analysis and it is not able to assess the likelihood of the simulated
behaviours. This is not acceptable from the point of view of SoS analysis, as it does not provide
to the designer sufficient confidence of correctness. Other approaches to verification of complex
systems are based on exhaustive formal analysis, such as model checking, or simulation-based
formal analysis, such as run-time monitoring. Industrial model checking techniques [7] are not
adequate to the complexity and dynamicity of SoS. Run-time monitoring does not seem to be
adequate to the context of SoS, where failures detection should provide a likelihood estimate of
the failure and sufficient time for devising failure-avoidance corrections. In this perspective, a
very promising approach to provide sufficient coverage of the SoS behaviour while keeping the
analysis cost low is based on Statistical Model Checking (SMC) [27]. SMC is a simulation-based
formal analysis providing an estimate of the likelihood of requirement satisfaction and a tunable
level of confidence on the goodness of analysis results.
In this paper we describe an industry-oriented tool-chain for SMC-based SoS verification.
Our methodology follows the approach to SoS verification developed in the DANSE EU Project,
where SoS analysis is a central activity in the continuous SoS development flow. We define a
formal specification language which is specific for the SoS context, usable and sufficiently ex-
pressive for capturing requirements at the CSs level and at the SoS level. Finally, we focus on
ensuring integration of the SMC analysis with existing industrial design tools and standards.
In particular, since CSs typically have different models of computation and are developed with
distinct authoring tools, we provide an integration framework to handle the heterogeneity of the
CSs behavioural models. The contribution of our work is summarized in the following steps:
(1) we adopt and extend a very expressive and usable OCL-based formal language (GCSL) to
specify requirements on SoS and its CSs; (2) we support wide-spread industry standards, includ-
ing UPDM [24] for SoS architecture design and the Functional Mock-up Interface (FMI) [23]
standard for Constituent Systems behavioural models integration, and (3) we provide a Statisti-
cal Model Checking tool-chain, integrated with system design tools used in industrial practice.
The paper is organized as follows. First, in Section 2 we investigate in more details what are
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the challenges raised in the analysis of SoS and identify five of them. Then, in Section 3 we pro-
vide a summary of the Statistical Model Checking approach adopted in our tool-chain. Following
this, in Section 4 we introduce the GCSL formal language for specifying formal requirements on
SoS and CSs behaviour. Finally, we discuss in Section 5 the SMC tool-chain and its integration
with existing industrial tools for System design. This tool-chain is demonstrated on an industrial
case study in Section 6, where we show its application to a Fire Emergency Response system
designed in DANSE [2], modelling a complex SoS that manages fire emergencies in a large city.
2 SoS Analysis Challenges
The main characteristics of a System of Systems have been long debated [18]. First, they are
dynamic (Constituent Systems may evolve, leave, fail, or be replaced). Second, they are made of
heterogeneous and autonomous components (raising a need for their correct integration). Third,
control is not centralized but is mostly based on cooperation. Fourth, SoS integration can give
rise to unexpected emergent behaviours caused by conflicts in local goals.
Designing appropriate solutions beforehand is beyond reach, thus SoS operation and design
is a continuous activity covering its entire life-cycle. This lead in the DANSE EU Project to
the development of a new SoS design and operation methodology [10]. A significant part of the
methodology is supported by the availability of a formal language for expressing requirements on
expected SoS behaviours and of a technology supporting the verification of these requirements.
We have identified five challenges that should be addressed by an SoS analysis technology for its
adoption in the continuous SoS (re)design and operation.
First Challenge (expressing formal SoS requirements): develop a usable language for express-
ing formal requirements such that dynamicity is a first-class concept, allowing to abstract from
the number and identity of CSs.
Second Challenge (checking achievement of requirements): ensure correct integration and co-
operation of CSs, through achievement of both local (CS) and global (SoS) requirements.
Third Challenge (enabling reactivity to change): provide continuous and affordable SoS eval-
uation to ensure failure prediction and changes evaluation.
Fourth Challenge (detecting emergent behaviours): enable the detection of emergent be-
haviours and verify the absence of the undesired ones. the DANSE EU Project provided a precise
classification of emergent behaviours [10], and SMC contributes in identifying the likelihood of
emergent behaviours caused by unpredicted interactions of CSs influencing the achievement of
SoS objectives.
Fifth Challenge (ensuring industry acceptance): provide a technology accepted by practi-
tioners, both in terms of usability and in terms of seamless integration with existing industrial
practice and tools.
In the rest of the paper we refer to these challenges and illustrate our choices in developing
a SoS Statistical Model Checking tool-chain supporting them.
3 Principles of Statistical Model Checking
Analyzing Systems of Systems according to the challenges developed above requires a careful
choice of the verification technique to use. The second challenge advocates for a formal verifi-
cation technique such as model checking, that often requires models to be written in dedicated
languages This is in conflicts with industry acceptance (fifth challenge) and even if a complete
model was available in a suitable language, analysis would not be feasible because of its very
large size. For this reason we rely on Statistical Model Checking (SMC) which we describe in
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this section.
In order to perform SMC, the system to analyze needs to be a stochastic process. More pre-
cisely, each new state is chosen probabilistically based on the current state and possibly on the
execution history. SMC scales better than traditional model checking because it relies only on
simulations to evaluate the probability that a given property holds. A simulation trace is a finite
sequence of timed system states. Throughout this section, we assume the following abstract
notion of trace to discuss our formal background.
Definition 1 Given a set of variables V and their domain D, a state σ is a valuation of the
variables, that is σ ∈ DV . A trace τ is a sequence of states and timestamps (σ0, t0), · · · , (σk, tk),
where ∀i ti ∈ R+ ∧ ti < ti+1.
3.1 BLTL Linear Temporal Logic
The properties to verify are expressed in BLTL, which is a variant of LTL [20] where each
temporal operator is bounded. Bounds make it possible to decide whether the formula holds on
a finite (and sufficiently long) trace. The core of BLTL is defined by the following grammar,
where the time subscript t is interpreted as an offset from the time instant where the sub-formula
is evaluated:
ϕ ::= true | false | p∈AP | ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2 | ¬ϕ | ϕ1 U≤t ϕ2 | X≤tϕ
Here, AP is a set of atomic predicates defined in Section 3.2. In our case, an atomic predicate
depends on the past states. The temporal modalities F (the “eventually”) and G (the “always”)
can be derived from the “until” U as Ftϕ = true U≤t ϕ and Gtϕ = ¬Ft¬ϕ, respectively. The
semantics of BLTL is defined with respect to finite traces τ . We denote by τ, i |= ϕ the fact
that a trace τ = (σ0, t0), · · · , (σ`, t`) satisfies the BLTL formula ϕ at point i of execution. The
meaning of τ, i |= ϕ is defined recursively:
τ, i |= true and τ, i 6|= false;
τ, i |= p if and only if p(τ, i) (cf. next Subsection);
τ, i |= ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2 if and only if τ, i |= ϕ1 and τ, i |= ϕ2;
τ, i |= ¬ ϕ if and only if τ, i 6|= ϕ;
τ, i |= ϕ1Utϕ2 if and only if there exists an integer j ≥ i such that (i) tj ≤ ti + t, (ii) τ, j |= ϕ2, and
(iii) τ, k |= ϕ1, for each i ≤ k < j;
τ, i |= X≤tϕ if and only if τk, 0 |= ϕ where k = min{j > i | tj > ti+t} and τk = ((s′0, t′0), · · · , (s′`−k, t′`−k))
with s′i = si+k and t′i = ti+k;
3.2 Atomic Predicates
Usually atomic predicates describe properties of system states, e.g. by comparing a variable
with a constant. We propose here an extension where atomic predicates also depend on the
past (i.e. from states before the current one). In particular, we are interested in measuring the
amount of time during which a given atomic predicate has been true, or the number of steps in
which a predicate is true. The syntax for our predicates is as follows:
AP ::= true | false | AP Bop AP | Nexp Cmp Nexp
Nexp ::= #Time | Id | Constant | dur(AP ) | occ(AP, a, b) | Nexp Nop Nexp
Here, Bop contains the usual boolean connectors , Nop the usual arithmetic operators and Cmp the
usual comparison operators. Given a trace τ = (σ0, t0), · · · , (σk, tk) and a step i, our predicates
are interpreted as follows:
[[true]](τ, i) = true and [[false]](τ, i) = false;
[[#Time]](τ, i) = ti is the simulation time at step i;
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[[id]](τ, i) = σi(id) is the value of var id at step i;
Operators and comparisons are interpreted in the standard way;
[[dur(p)]](τ, i) = 0, if i = 1,
[[dur(p)]](τ, i) = dur(p)(τ, i− 1), if i > 1 ∧ ¬[[p]](τ, i− 1),
[[dur(p)]](τ, i) = dur(p)(τ, i− 1) + ti − ti−1, otherwise.
[[occ(p, a, b)]](τ, i) =
∑
a≤tj≤b 1{true}([[p]](τ, j))
The dur function computes the amount of time during which the predicate p has been true since
the beginning of the trace. The #Time notation returns the simulation time at the current
point. The occ function computes the number of steps in which a predicate holds within the
given time bound. For instance, G≤t(dur(UP) > 0.9 ·#Time) is true iff for every step between
0 and t, the amount of time during which UP holds is at least 90% of the elapsed time.
3.3 Statistical Model Checking
Given a stochastic systemM and a property ϕ, SMC is a simulation-based analysis technique [27,
22] that answers two questions: (1) Qualitative : whether the probability p forM to satisfy ϕ
is greater or equal to a certain threshold ϑ or not; (2) Quantitative : what is the probability
p for M to satisfy ϕ. In both cases, producing a trace τ and checking whether it satisfies ϕ is
modeled as a Bernoulli random variable Bi of parameter p. Such a variable is 0 (τ 6|= ϕ) or 1
(τ |= ϕ), with Pr[Bi = 1] = p and Pr[Bi = 0] = 1− p. We want to evaluate p.
Qualitative Approach The main approaches [26, 22] proposed to answer the qualitative ques-
tion are based on Hypothesis Testing. In order to determine whether p ≥ ϑ, we follow a test-based
approach, which does not guarantee a correct result but controls the probability of an error. We
consider two hypothesis: H : p ≥ ϑ and K : p < ϑ. The test is parameterized by two bounds,
α and β. The probability of accepting K (resp. H) when H (resp. K) holds is bounded by α
(resp. β). Such algorithms sequentially execute simulations until either H or K can be returned
with a confidence α or β, which is dynamically detected. Other sequential hypothesis testing
approaches exists, which are based on Bayesian approach [15].
Quantitative Approach In [12, 16] Peyronnet et al. propose an estimation procedure to
compute the probability p for M to satisfy ϕ. Given a precision ε, Peyronnet’s procedure,
which we call PESTIM , computes an estimate p′ of p with confidence 1− δ, for which we have:
Pr(|p′ − p|≤ε) ≥ 1 − δ. This procedure is based on the Chernoff-Hoeffding bound [13], which
provides the minimum number of simulations required to ensure the desired confidence level.
The quantitative approach is used when there is no known approximation of the probability
to evaluate, i.e. to obtain a first approximation. This method is useful when the goal of the
analysis is to have a idea on how well the model behaves. The qualitative approach determines
whether the probability is above a given threshold, with a high confidence and in a minimal
number of simulations.
4 Timed OCL Constraints for SoS
The challenge in promoting the use of formal specification languages in an industrial setting is
essentially to provide a good balance between expressiveness and usability. In this section we
present the requirements language, called GCSL (Goal and Contract Requirement Language).
The full GCSL language specification, as well as the details of translation of the GCSL patterns
into BLTL, can be retrieved in [4]. In this section we focus on providing a brief recap of the
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language and illustrate why it is appropriate to define SoS and CSs requirements. We also dis-
cuss an explicit contribution of this paper to GCSL, which consists of two new patterns and the
extension of the supported OCL fragment.
A GCSL contract is a pair of Assume/Guarantee assertions denoting requirements on SoS and
CSs inputs and outputs, respectively. Contracts allow us to decompose requirements and perform
local or global verification on need. Assertions are built upon GCSL natural-language patterns,
some of which are shown in Figure 1. GCSL patterns are inspired by and extend the Contract
Specification Language (CSL) patterns [1], developed in the SPEEDS European project. These
natural-language based requirements have their formal semantics defined by translation into cor-
responding BLTL formulas, enabling the application of SMC. To simplify the specification of
properties of complex systems and architectures, GCSL integrates the Object Constraint Lan-
guage (OCL) [25], a formal language used to describe static properties of UML models. OCL is
an important means to improve the expressiveness and usability of GCSL patterns. Using OCL
we can describe properties about types of CS in the SoS architecture, while being independent
of their actual number of instances and, thus, defining requirements that are adaptable to the
natural evolution of the SoS, without the need of rewriting them. Consider the following example
(based on Pattern 12 from Fig. 1), showing the expressiveness of using OCL within GCSL:
SoS.its(CriticalComponent) → forAll(cc |
whenever [ cc.its(TempSensor) → exists(ts | ts.temp > cc.threshold) ] occurs
[ cc.connected(CoolingFan) → exists(f | f.on) ] occurs within [ 1 min, 5 min ] )
This architecture-abstract requirement says that if any CS of type CriticalComponent has one of
its TempSensor measuring at time t a temperature that is higher than the threshold set by the
specific CriticalComponent (the threshold may be different for distinct components) then one of
the CoolingFan connected to that component should be switched on within the [t+1 min,t+5 min]
time frame. This property does not depend on a concrete architecture or on the number of the
mentioned CSs but it can be used as a requirement for any SoS having an architecture that
integrates the mentioned CSs types.
The idea of mixing OCL and temporal logic originates from the need of specifying static and
dynamic properties of object-based systems. In [9, 29] OCL has been extended with CTL and
(finite) LTL, respectively, without support for real-time properties. The work in [11] is more
similar to ours and it is based on ClockedLTL, a real-time extension of LTL. ClockedLTL is
slightly more expressive than BLTL, because it allows unbounded temporal operators, whereas
BLTL is decidable on a finite trace. Patterns provide a convenient way to represent frequently
occurring and well-identified schemes, while avoiding errors due to the complexity of the under-
lying logic. The methodology developed during the DANSE EU Project prescribes to have a
library of patterns [4] that captures the most relevant temporal constraints for the considered
domain. In the rest of this section we are going to discuss a number of these pre-defined patterns.
The expressiveness of BLTL, jointly with OCL, makes the patterns library easily extensible to
cover future, domain-specific needs.
Figure 1 shows some of the behavioural patterns of GCSL (all the patterns can be found
in [4]). Patterns 2 and 3 are typical safety properties, where Ψ denotes an argument where an
OCL property can be used to describe a state of the SoS. The translation of pattern 2 into BLTL
states that the atomic property Ψ should be true at every real-time instant within simulation
end time k. Pattern 3 is translated similarly. Pattern 8 shows the joint use of events counting
(the n indicates a number of occurrences triggering the pattern) within a real-time interval, such
as [3.2 seconds, 25.7 minutes]. Its translation relies on the BLTL operator occ and, even if it
does not involve any temporal operator, it cannot be decided on a single state but it needs to
be checked across the entire trace. In this case we have no explicit mentioning of the simulation
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ID Pattern (below, k is the simulation
time and a < b ≤ k)
2 always [Ψ] G≤k(Ψ)
3 whenever [Ψ1] occurs [Ψ2] holds G≤k(Ψ1 → Ψ2)
. . . . . .
8 [Ψ1] occurs at most n times during [a,b] occ(Ψ1, a, b) ≤ n
. . . . . .
12 whenever [Ψ1] occurs [Ψ2] occurs within [a,b] G≤k−b(Ψ1 →
X≤aF≤b−aΨ2)
13 always during [a,b], [Ψ] has been true at least [e] %
of time




14 at [b], [Ψ] has been true at least [e] % of time F≤b(dur(Ψ) ≥ e100 ∗ b)
Figure 1: GCSL Patterns extract and their BLTL translations, with Ψ,Ψ1,Ψ2 ∈ OCL-prop,
a, b ∈ R, e ∈ OCL-expr.
OCL-prop ::= true | false | FQN | not OCL-prop | OCL-prop ◦ OCL-prop |
OCL-expr ./ OCL-expr | OCL-coll → forAll( var | OCL-prop [var ] ) |
OCL-coll → exists( var | OCL-prop [var ] ) |
OCL-coll → empty() | OCL-coll → notempty()
OCL-expr ::= FQN | OCL-coll → sum() | OCL-coll → size() | . . .
OCL-coll ::= attribute | csName | its(type) | connected(type) | OCL-coll . OCL-coll
Figure 2: Simplified OCL fragment for GCSL Atomic Properties, with ◦ ∈ {∧,∨,→,↔} and ./
∈ {>,≥,=, <,≤}.
time k but we have the overall constraint on all patterns requiring a, b to have appropriate val-
ues (a ≤ b ≤ k). Pattern 12 is used to express a liveness property which is triggered by an initial
condition Ψ1 occurring at time t and discharged by a following condition Ψ2 occurring within
the interval [t+ a, t+ b] that is relative w.r.t. the time t of occurrence of Ψ1. Its translation into
BLTL underlines a number of important aspects of this pattern. First, the pattern is verified on
the entire simulation up to time k− b. This is needed because if a condition Ψ1 occurs at k− b,
we need to have enough remaining time (actually b) to verify whether either it is discharged by
a condition Ψ2 (making the pattern true) or not. As a consequence, a condition Ψ1 occurring
after time k−b would not require any following discharging condition. Second, on the occurrence
of a condition Ψ1 the pattern requires a shift to time a (as close as possible, depending on the
actual states produced by simulation) which is indicated by the next operator X≤a. From that
point onwards, we can check for the occurrence of the condition Ψ2 in the remaining interval
using F≤b−a. Finally, patterns 13 and 14 are new w.r.t. [3, 6] and are very suitable for expressing
safety and reliability constraints, such as the availability of a SoS, as we are going to demon-
strate in Section 6. The BLTL translation of these patterns relies on the novel #Time and dur
constructs introduced in Section 3, that were not present in [3, 6]. Pattern 13 checks that, at
each simulation point during [a,b], the amount of time during which Ψ has been seen to be true
so-far is at least e% of the currently elapsed simulation time. As defined in Section 3, if in (σi, ti)
the property Ψ is true, it is also true for the time ti+1 − ti, until the next state (σi+1, ti+1). We
use the operator dur to accumulate the overall time during which Ψ is true, and we compare
the accumulated value with the required portion of the current simulation time, extracted with
the operator #Time, at each simulation point. Pattern 14 checks that, within [b] the amount of
time during which Ψ has been seen to be true is at least the required portion of b.
Figure 2 shows a (simplified) portion of the grammar defining the OCL integration within
the GCSL atomic properties (indicated by OCL-prop). Properties are constructed using usual
boolean operators (◦) and basic arithmetic comparisons (./) between expressions. Attributes of
Constituent Systems can occur in properties or expressions and can be accessed by using their
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Fully Qualified Name (FQN ), such as SoS.Sensor03.isOn.
OCL propositions can describe properties about sets of Constituent Systems that are unknown
at requirements-definition time. These sets are left undetermined because (1) the requirements
may apply to several variant architectures of the same SoS and (2) the SoS architecture may
evolve during the SoS life-cycle. Indeed in [18] one of the five SoS-specific properties of a complex
system is that the number and type of systems participating to a SoS may change over time. Ide-
ally, the specifications of the system should remain independent of the number and type of CSs,
which is exactly what OCL provides as a feature within GCSL. In order to support properties
that are parametrized by the SoS architecture, GCSL provides the quantifiers forAll and exists
that allow us to instantiate properties over finite collections (OCL-coll) of Constituent Systems
(the var ranges over these collections and occurs in the OCL-prop which is the scope of the
quantifier). A corner case of quantification is provided by the set operators empty and notempty
that simply return a truth value after testing the emptiness of the collection. Standard OCL
allows to concatenate object names (here indicated as csName) by the “ .”-containment relation,
until reaching an attribute. In GCSL we add (1) another (weak) containment operator (its) that
allows to navigate the systems hierarchy in terms of CSs types and (2) an operator (connected)
that allows to navigate the neighborhood of a CS, again in terms of types. Quantifiers occur also
in expressions (OCL-expr) and allow to aggregate the values of (equally-typed) attributes. E.g.
the simple expression
(SoS.its(Sensor).temp → sum( ))/(SoS.its(Sensor) → size( ))
can be used to compute the average temperature in a SoS where the number of CS of type Sensor
is unknown or time-dependent.
Since BLTL does not cover the OCL syntax (except for FQN ), the translation from GCSL to
BLTL is done once the architecture is fully know and fixed. OCL operators can be nested and
their elimination is performed by induction over the structure of the formula in an outside-in
fashion. Conceptually, this can be done by repeated application of three steps: (1) resolution of
the outermost OCL collections (that is, replacing a collection with a finite set of FQN ), which
eliminates its and connected operators, (2) elimination of the universal (existential) quantifiers,
replaced by the corresponding conjunctions (disjunctions) of the instantiated scopes, (3) elim-
ination of the remaining operators by replacement with corresponding Boolean or arithmetic
expressions, and (4) recursion on new outermost OCL collections. Termination of this proce-
dure is trivially proved. The tool-chain dynamically evaluates OCL formulas as the architecture
changes.
5 SMC Tool-chain
This Section describes the tool-chain we have set-up in the DANSE EU Project to address all the
challenges listed in Section 2. The core of our SMC tool-chain is composed of three main tools:
IBM Rhapsody is the tool implementing the UPDM language, DESYRE is the tool providing the
joint simulation engine for SMC and PLASMA is the tool providing the SMC analysis engine. A
SoS model consists of a model of the architecture and a model of each Constituent System. Our
choice is to use UPDM to describe the architecture, containing instances of Constituent Systems
and their interconnection. In order to encompass heterogeneity of the CSs model, our only
requirement is that they comply with the Functional Mock-up Interface (FMI) [23]. Additional
modelling and simulation tools like for example Modelica, JModelica, Dymola, Rhapsody and
Simulink/StateFlow or any tool exporting models to FMI 1.0 can be seamlessly integrated with
this core tool-chain thanks to our choice to adopt that standard. The remaining of this Section
describes our core SMC tool-chain.
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5.1 Describing SoS Architecture in IBM Rhapsody
UPDM, or Unified Profile for DoDAF1 and MoDAF2 [24], is a modelling language based on
UML 2 standardized by the Object Management Group (OMG) in 2012. IBM Rational Rhap-
sody [14] is a model-based system engineering environment implementing industry-standard lan-
guages such as UML, SysML and UPDM. The SoS architecture is specified in this tool by using
UPDM, conveniently extended with a new DANSE-specific profile enabling (among other fea-
tures) pseudo-random number generation according to uniform, normal or custom probability
distributions to meet SMC analysis specification needs. Rhapsody provides a Java API set for
integration with external tools. We developed a Java Exporter Plug-in to translate informations
from the UPDM SoS architecture model to a format intelligible by DESYRE, the joint simulation
engine.
5.2 Performing Joint Simulation in DESYRE
Joint simulation capabilities are provided by DESYRE [19], a simulation framework based on
the SystemC standard and its discrete-event simulation kernel. Inputs to DESYRE are the SoS
architecture exported from Rhapsody and the Functional Mock-up Units (FMUs) associated to
CS types. Joint simulation of several FMUs, that are units complying with the FMI standard, is
implemented by a Master Algorithm (MA), with two alternatives. In co-simulation, each FMU
embeds its own ODE solver and computes autonomously the evolution of its continuous-time
variables. In model exchange, the MA is in charge of computing evolution of continuous-time
variable. In general the implementation of a master algorithm (MA) is not a trivial task hav-
ing to guarantee: (1) correctness of the composition according to the model(s) of computation
(MoC) of both the host environment and the constituent FMUs, (2) termination of the integra-
tion step and (3) determinism of the composition. Challenges related to the implementation of
master algorithms for model composition, have been extensively addressed in the literature. In
[17] the authors define the operational and denotational semantics of the (hierarchical) compo-
sition of Synchronous Reactive (SR), Discrete Event (DE), and Continuous Time (CT) models.
Termination and determinacy properties of MA for co-simulation are addressed in [8].
5.2.1 DESYRE Master Algorithm
Within the context of the DANSE EU Project a specific FMI master algorithm has been de-
veloped in DESYRE to address the unique needs of Systems of Systems simulation and SMC.
The main focus is on simulation efficiency due to SoS model complexity and large observation
(i.e. simulation) time span (up to several years) and to support large number of runs (tens or
hundreds of thousands) as required by SMC analysis. The MA builds on a set of assumptions
that are typically satisfied by the CS models used within the DANSE context. The choice of
a MA for model exchange rather than co-simulation provides us with full control of the overall
integration algorithm. The MA assumes that none of the FMUs contains direct feed-through i.e.
FMU output does not depend on the value of its inputs at the current simulation time, removing
the need for a causality analysis during fixed-point computation.
Lines 1 to 11 in Algorithm 1 represent the initialization phase, while lines 12 to 25 describe
the SoS system simulation loop. The algorithm determines the time synchronization instants for
the different FMUs composing the SoS model. Time synchronization points represent those time
instants in which (1) the different FMUs are executed, (2) the generated outputs are propagated
1Department of Defence Architecture Framework
2Ministry of Defence Architecture Framework
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Algorithm 1 DESYRE FMI MA for DANSE.
Input: simStartT ime, simEndTime,maxIntStep;
1: simTime = simStartT ime;
2: isCT = determineIfCT ();
3: for all cs ∈ csList do
4: csEvt = cs.initialize(simTime);
5: if (csEvt 6= ∅); then
6: evtQueue.addEvt(cs.getID(), csEvt);
7: end if




12: while (simTime ≤ simEndTime and not(simStopEvt)) do
13: simTime = getSimTime();
14: while (not(isSoSFixPtReached())) do








23: simTime = evtQueue.getClosestEvtTime();
24: waitNextActivationEvt();
25: end while
among their interfaces (line 16) and (3) FMU continuous state is updated (line 20). Synchro-
nization points are calculated based on time events, state events and step events notified by the
different FMUs [23].
5.3 SMC Analysis in PLASMA
PLASMA is a tool for performing SMC analysis. The core of PLASMA is a set of SMC al-
gorithms, including those presented in Subsection 3.3. This core is completed by two types of
plug-ins, that are controlled by the SMC algorithm. Simulator plug-ins implement or interface
PLASMA with a simulator, in order to produce a trace. Such plug-ins enable verification for
RML, SystemC or Matlab/Simulink models. Specification languages are added by providing
checker plug-ins that verify whether a finite trace satisfy a property. For instance, there is a
checker plug-in for handling BLTL. For the work presented in this paper, we built a new simu-
lator plug-in to integrate PLASMA with DESYRE. The interaction between them is described
in details in [19]. We also extended the BLTL plugin to provide new primitives, namely dur , occ
and #Time.
6 Industrial Case Study
6.1 Modeling
We modelled an emergency response SoS for a city fire scenario in UPDM. The city is partitioned
into 10 districts and the example is focused on a few fire-fighting constituent systems (CS) for
which the behaviour was modelled: the Fire Head Quarter (FireHQ), the Fire Stations, the
Fire Fighting Cars, the Fire Men. The SoS integrated architecture was built by instantiating
the CSs and by specifying how to connect them through an Internal Block Diagram, shown
in Figure 3. The behaviour of the CSs has been modelled in several FMI-compliant authoring
tools. For example, the FireMan has been modelled in OpenModelica (as shown in Figure 4)
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Figure 3: SoS architecture in Rhapsody Figure 4: CS behaviour modelled in other
tools (e.g. OpenModelica)
which is an open-source multi-domain modelling tool based on the Modelica language. Other
CSs have been modelled using Rhapsody state-charts. The SoS architecture is exported to DE-
SYRE using a DANSE-specific exporter plug-in. Each CS behavioural model is exported from
the corresponding authoring tool into FMUs, according to the FMI standard. This enables the
DESYRE platform to simulate the whole SoS model and plot some selected variables, as shown
in Figure 5.
6.2 Expressing Goals of the SoS
Figure 5: Simulation results in DESYRE
We now show how our tool chain answers
Challenge 1 from Section 2. In order to vali-
date our model, we want to check that dur-
ing simulations, the fire area remains small
enough. In order to define “small enough” in-
dependently of the number of components, we
require that the fire is less than a given per-
centage of the total area. Each district has
two variables of interest, its area and the fire
area.
Our first formulation states that the fire
area is less than X percent of the total area.
The total fire area is the sum of the fire area in each district, which can be expressed in GCSL
by SoS.its(Districts).fireArea->sum(). We define Pattern 1 as follows:
always [SoS.its(Districts).fireArea → sum() > (X/100)∗SoS.its(Districts).area → sum()]
As Pattern 1 might be too strong, we propose an alternative formulation. More precisely, we
allow the fire area to exceed X% of the total area, but no more than 10% of the time. For
technical reasons, we define Pattern 2 as the negation of the above property, namely:
at [ 10000 ], [SoS.its(Districts).fireArea → sum() >
(X/100)∗SoS.its(Districts).area → sum()] has been true at least [ 10 ] % of time
Pattern 2 is true whenever the fire area is above the threshold for more than 10% of the time,
that is when the SoS behaves incorrectly.
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6.3 Emergent Behaviours Detection and Evaluation
The fourth challenge described in Section 2 is about the detection and analysis of emergent
behaviour. In our case, simulation allowed us to detect an (undesired) emergent behaviour
which is depicted in the lower part of Figure 5. Our analysis of this emergent behaviour is
the evaluation of the probability of its occurrence. The first step is to define a GSCL pattern
that characterizes the absence of the emergent behaviour. One key characteristic of this be-
haviour is that fires spread over entire districts. We assume that the emergent behaviour does
not occur if there is no area where the fire has taken the whole district. This is specified in
Pattern 3: always [SoS.its(Districts) → forAll(district |district.fireArea < district.area ) ]
6.4 Analysis and Discussions
We show here how the second challenge from Section 2 is handled by our methodology. More
precisely, we evaluate the probability that Pattern 1, 2 and 3 hold. As explained in Subsection 3.3,
SMC provides an approximation of such a probability. As we don’t know which value to expect,
we use the PESTIM method. This analysis is parameterized by an allowed error ε, and a
confidence 1− δ. We chose an error of 0.1 and a confidence of 99% (δ = 0.01), which is attained
with 265 simulations. The length of a simulation is set to 10000s. We present the results for
Pattern 1 in Table 1. As expected, the probability that the fire remains smaller than X% of the
Table 1: Probability that fire is always
smaller than X percent of the total area dur-
ing 10000 seconds.







Table 2: Probability that fire area is smaller
than X percent of the total area at least 90%
of the time.







total area increases when X increases. Indeed, “the fire area remains smaller than X% of the
total area” implies that “the fire area remains smaller than Y% of the total area” for any Y ≥ X.
However, the probability returned is an approximation, with an error up to 0.1 with a confidence
of 99%. Therefore, the fact that the probability decreases from 0.96 to 0.95 when X increases
from 0.01 to 0.1 is not significant as the difference between the two values is less than the error.
However, the difference between the probabilities obtained for X = 0.0001 and X = 0.001 are
significant since they are more than twice the error. In our model, the total area is about 23
square kilometres. Therefore the two last lines of the table correspond to respectively an area of
23 and 2.3 square meters.
In order to obtain the probability presented in Table 2, we had to complement the probability
that Pattern 2 holds. We obtain the probability that the fire is smaller than X percent of the
total area for at least 90% of the time (over 10000s). As discussed previously, since for each
value of X we ran a different set of simulation, it’s not clear that the probability that the pattern
holds increases when X increases. With this more permissive definition, we see that even small
fires have a low probability to stay on for more that 10% of the simulation time. By comparing
with Table 1, we can conclude that frequently occurring fires (i.e. very small ones) are quickly
extinguished, because the probability of the last two lines are significantly higher in Table 2.
Finally, we evaluate the probability to obtain the emergent behaviour depicted in Figure 5,
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that is the probability that Pattern 3 holds. The returned result is 0.9622, which means that the
real probability that the contract holds is between 0.8622 and 1 with a confidence of 99%.
We showed here how our tool chain is used to evaluate whether a given pattern holds. By
evaluating the probability of Pattern 1, 2 and 3, we were able to discover that small fire occur often
(last two lines of Table 1) but are not likely to last long (last two lines of Table 2). Finally, the
emergent behaviour occurs with a probability between 0 and 0.14, which explains why Pattern 1
and Pattern 2 do not occur with a probability of 1. This problem could be resolved by studying
the causes of the emergent behaviour and evolving the SoS to avoid it, for instance by adding
more fire fighting cars.
At this level of analysis, a precision of 0.1 is sufficient to obtain a good general idea about
the probability that each of the patterns occur. In general, using SMC requires to find the
appropriate trade-off between the required precision and the time available for the analysis and
subsequent re-engineering.
We address the third challenge, evolution, by having Patterns that are independent on the
actual number of components. Indeed, adding constituent systems such as districts or cars, even
if they have a new behaviour, do not require specifying new patterns. The analysis is still possible
on the modified SoS model.
In the frame of the DANSE project, Industrial Partners built models of their SoS under
analysis. SMC and other methods provided them a higher confidence in their models [5]. More
precisely, one Partner verified Mean Time Between Failures (safety) requirements in an Air Traffic
Control case study. Another Partner verified sufficient water availability (robustness to failures)
in a water distribution system of national scale.
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